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Resolving Client Conflicts by
Hiring “Conflicts Counsel”
Ronald D. Rotunda
A general principle of legal ethics is that a law firm may not represent a client suing
someone who is also a client of the law firm (1) even though the two matters are
unrelated, (2) a different law firm represents the client in that law suit, and (3) there is
no risk that the lawyer would violate the confidences of any client. Other ethics rules
magnify the significance of this rule by imputing the disqualification of every lawyer in
the law firm to every other lawyer in the same firm. Courts enforce these rules by
disqualifying the offending law firm.
In general, sound reasons support these ethics rules. Yet, there are situations where
these rules require disqualification although there is no legitimate client expectation of
loss of loyalty or confidence. There is nascent case law in the lower courts that
recognizes this problem and offers a solution: using what I call “conflicts counsel,”
meaning that the client retains a new lawyer from a different law firm to handle a
discrete, severable matter—the matter that created the conflict. Although these cases—
typically in the area of discovery and bankruptcy—do not discuss their rationale, their
instincts are correct: using conflicts counsel in certain situations mitigates the burden of
disqualification while protecting the underlying reasons behind disqualification. Courts
should follow these decisions, which are typically unpublished.

 The Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman
University School of Law. I am thankful to Ms. Leslie Holmes Watkins, J.D. 2011, Chapman
University School of Law, for her research assistance. And I am indebted to Professors Daniel B.
Bogart, John S. Dzienkowski, Monroe H. Freedman, Thomas D. Morgan, and Richard W. Painter for
their helpful comments and critiques. Needless to say, I can only blame myself for the errors.
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Introduction
The general rule of legal ethics is that a law firm may not represent
a client who is suing someone who is also a client of the law firm, even
though (1) the two matters are unrelated, (2) a different law firm
represents the client in that lawsuit, and (3) there is no risk that the
1
lawyer would violate the confidences of any client. This rule has bite,
because courts routinely enforce it in the course of litigation by
disqualifying the law firm.
A party’s successful disqualification motion not only protects the
client, but also imposes costs on the adversary because the adverse party
2
must now hire and educate new counsel. Courts should not
1. E.g., Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer’s Deskbook
on Professional Responsibility § 1.7-3 (2009).
2. Some argue that some lawyers make strategic disqualification motions—where the primary
motive of the movant is to impose costs on the adversary. See, e.g., Laryngeal Mask Co. v. Ambu A/S,
No. 07-CV-1988-DMS (NLS), 2008 WL 558561, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008) (“The Court has in
mind the legitimate interests of Defendants Ambu to oppose a strategic disqualification motion of its
counsel of choice . . . .”); see also Rebecca Dean, Practical Ethics for the Employment Lawyer &
Corporate Employment Law Counsel, in 35th Annual Institute on Employment Law 477 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 8878, 2006) (“Strategic disqualification motions are
hardly unheard of.”); Linda Ann Winslow, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A
Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 863, 878 (1987) (“Denial of third party
standing would limit unmerited strategic disqualification motions without permitting violations by
attorneys to go unchecked.”).
Initially, the ABA Model Rules acknowledged this position, when an older version said that a
charge of conflict of interest “should be viewed with caution . . . for it can be misused as a technique of
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unnecessarily impose these costs if they can protect client interests
through other means.
Other ethics rules magnify the significance of this rule by routinely
imputing the disqualification of every lawyer in the law firm to every
3
other lawyer in the same firm. The impact of the imputation rule has
grown over the years, as law firms have increased in size and spread in
geography—it is no longer unusual for law firms to consist of hundreds of
lawyers spread throughout the United States and other countries. In
addition, lawyers have become more mobile over the years. In the old
days, it was common for lawyers to join a law firm for life. It was like
4
marriage. Now, joining a law firm is more like a marriage in Hollywood:
It is not for life. When lawyers move, they take their disqualifications
5
with them; when lawyers move with greater frequency, they can become
a modern-day Typhoid Mary, infecting one law firm after another with
their disqualifications.
Moreover, states often impute disqualification even when the ABA
Model Rules would allow the law firm to avoid it by creating a screen to
6
wall off the disqualified lawyer from his or her colleagues in the firm.
States are concerned that the screen will be translucent, not opaque, and
that confidences will leak from the lawyers who are supposed to be
7
walled off from their partners.
harassment.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. (1983). The post-2002 version does not
include this comment, see Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 (2010), though some states
continue to retain it, see, e.g., Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.06 cmt. 17 (2005).
We should recognize that a motion to disqualify is either frivolous or it is not. If it is frivolous,
the court should obviously reject it. If it is not frivolous, the court should rule on the merits without
regard to the motive of the movant. Should a judge say, every time a lawyer objects to hearsay, “Aha,
a hearsay objection—I should be careful in ruling, because the lawyer might be making it for tactical
reasons”? No party makes any motion that it regards as strategically disadvantageous.
Courts often require that only a party who has standing may raise a conflict of interest in a
motion to disqualify. See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir.
1976); FMC Techs., Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2006). Another concern
is laches. See Jackson v. J.C. Penney Co., 521 F. Supp. 1032, 1034–35 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Robert C.
Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, Standing, Waiver, Laches, and Appealability in Attorney
Disqualification Cases, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 82, 84–87 (1980); Douglas R. Richmond, The Rude Question of
Standing in Attorney Disqualification Disputes, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 17, 54 (2001).
3. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10 (2010). The prior ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility had a similar provision: Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D). Model Code of
Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-105(D) (1980).
4. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Hillman on Lawyer Mobility (2d ed. 1998) (describing
and analyzing the complex law that has developed as lawyers leave firms and take—or try to take—
their clients with them). The future promises increased lawyer mobility. Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility
and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary
Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. Legal Prof. 199, 200–02 (2007).
5. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10(a), (b) (2010).
6. Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Selected Standards on Professional
Responsibility app. B (2009) (charting the states’ screening provisions).
7. Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics § 10.20 (3d ed.
2004).
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As discussed below, sound reasons underlie the ethics rules that
prevent a lawyer representing one client from simultaneously taking a
position adverse to another current client, even though a different law
firm represents that other client. And, there are equally sound reasons
supporting the general rule that imputes one lawyer’s disqualification to
all the other lawyers in the same firm. Yet, situations arise when the
simultaneous representation rule and the imputation rule impose costs
that greatly exceed their benefits.
One would think that it would be easy for the courts simply to adopt
a new rule to deal with problems as they occur. After all, rules governing
the practice of law are found in the ethics rules that the state supreme
courts (or the federal courts) adopt to govern lawyers admitted to
8
practice before them. These rules, like the rules of evidence or civil
procedure, are real law with real-life consequences. And, while courts
have no power to change statutes, it is easy for the courts to change their
own rules.
Nonetheless, the ethics rules do not presently provide a solution
where the simultaneous disqualification rule and the imputation rule
disqualify a law firm even when there is no legitimate client expectation
of loyalty and confidentiality. What makes this situation unusual is that
there is nascent case law in the lower courts that recognizes the problem
and then suggests a solution: using what I call “conflicts counsel,”
meaning that the client retains a new lawyer from a different law firm to
handle a discrete, severable matter—the matter that created the conflict.
Yet, these cases typically do not discuss why they allow use of conflicts
counsel; they simply embrace the idea without exploring the rationale
behind it.
This Article will investigate the rationale for, discuss the case law
that appears to implement the concept of, and explain why the use of
conflicts counsel in certain situations is a useful and valuable solution
that respects legitimate client concerns. This Article concludes by
arguing that the ABA House of Delegates should legitimize the use of
conflicts counsel by enacting a Model Rule of Professional Conduct that
codifies it and clarifies its limits. These Model Rules are the basic
template that nearly every jurisdiction uses when courts adopt the Rules
of Professional Responsibility to govern lawyers who practice before
9
them, so the ABA’s recognition of conflicts counsel is vital.
First, let us briefly turn to the underlying justification and reach of
the rule disqualifying a lawyer from simultaneously representing
8. Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional Responsibility: Problems and
Materials 31 (10th ed. 2008).
9. In fact, the Tenth Circuit has instructed lawyers that the ABA Model Rules reflect the
“national standard” that courts should use in ruling on disqualification motions. See Cole v. Ruidoso
Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994).
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conflicting interests. Then, we will look at the rationale for the rule
imputing this disqualification to all members of the same law firm. These
two basic rules—forbidding simultaneous representation and imputing
disqualification—create the problem. Finally, we will look at the
emerging case law that supports the use of conflicts counsel, even though
the courts routinely do not explain the raison d’être for what they have
intuited.

I. Simultaneous Representation of Conflicting Interests
The rule prohibiting simultaneous representation of conflicting
interests derives from two basic principles of legal ethics: the duty to
respect client confidences and the duty of client loyalty. The reach of
these two principles is extended by yet two other principles: the routine
imputation of a lawyer’s disqualification to everyone else in the same
firm, and the rule prohibiting a law firm to convert a present client to a
former one by dropping that client in order to accept another, more
favored client. Clients can waive their protections but often do not do so.
Let us now consider each of these principles.
A. The Duty to Respect Client Confidences
Two rationales justify the prophylactic rule that prohibits a lawyer
from suing or being adverse to a current client. First, there is the lawyer’s
10
duty to protect the client’s confidences and secrets.
It is easy to understand why a lawyer may not represent a client in
one case while being adverse to the client in another case, if the lawyer
has learned confidences in one case that would be useful or relevant in
11
the other. Lawyers have a duty to keep their client’s confidences; this
12
duty applies forever. It applies to protect the confidences of former
13
clients, so it surely should apply to protect the confidences of current
clients.
The factual matters, the nature, or the subject matter of the two
cases may look dissimilar to a lay person: The touchstone is relevant
confidences. For example, assume that a lawyer representing a
businessperson who is creating a corporation learns extensive private
14
financial information about that person. She may not simultaneously
represent the spouse of that businessperson in seeking a divorce, because
the lawyer’s confidential knowledge of the businessperson’s finances

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(a) & 1.9 cmt. 1 (2010).
Id. R. 1.6(a) & 1.7 cmts. 18 & 19.
Id. R. 1.9(c).
Id. R. 1.9.
See id. R. 1.9 cmt. 3.
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would be relevant to the spouse’s efforts to divide the estate.
Representing Client Alpha, who is creating a corporation, does not look
similar to representing Client Beta, who is seeking a divorce, but in
context, the lawyer for Alpha will learn confidential financial
information relevant to the divorce of Client Beta. Because the lawyer’s
duty to keep confidences outlasts the attorney-client relationship, the
lawyer cannot avoid the duty by dropping Client Alpha like a hot
16
potato.
B. The Duty of Loyalty
In addition to the duty to respect clients’ confidences, the lawyer
17
owes a duty of loyalty to current clients. The general principle is that
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty only applies to current clients, not former
18
ones. The lawyer may not be adverse to a current client—even if she
learned no confidence that would be relevant in the other case—because
of this fiduciary duty. Even if the matters are “wholly unrelated,” the
19
client is “likely to feel betrayed” because of the lawyer’s disloyalty. For
example, a lawyer breaches her duty of loyalty if she represents a wife in
a divorce suit against the husband while simultaneously representing the
husband seeking to collect on his worker’s compensation claim. We can
assume that there are no breaches of confidences, and the cases are
completely unrelated. But the lawyer still violates her duty of loyalty to a
20
21
current client. This prohibition goes back at least 700 years.
A leading case is Grievance Comm. of the Bar of Hartford County v.
22
Rottner. In that case, the law firm accepted an assault and battery case
23
for a client, O’Brien, against another client, Twible. At the same time,

15. See, e.g., id. R. 1.6(a) & 1.8(b). Indeed, because the requirement to preserve client confidences
extends beyond the current representation—the duty to keep the client’s secrets is essentially
forever—the lawyer cannot represent the spouse even if she no longer represents the businessperson.
Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 3.
16. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, One Potato, Two Potato, Three Potato, Four, Legal Times,
Aug. 12, 1991, at 23, available at 1991 WLNR 4818941.
17. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2010).
18. There are a few instances where the lawyer cannot be adverse to a former client, even where
there may be no breaches of confidentiality. For example, a lawyer may not rescind, on behalf of a
new client, a contract that the lawyer drafted for a former client. Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 1. To that extent, the
duty of loyalty outlasts the attorney-client relationship.
19. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
20. Memphis & Shelby Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Sanderson, 378 S.W.2d 173, 182–83, 186 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1963) (disbarring a lawyer because, in addition to other infractions, he was representing a man in
a worker’s compensation case, while being adverse to him in a divorce case).
21. Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Early
Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 137, 139 n.11, 146–47 (2000) (noting that the
London Ordinance of 1280 forbid a lawyer from simultaneously representing conflicting parties).
22. 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964). For a thorough discussion of Rottner, see Thomas D. Morgan,
Suing a Current Client, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1157, 1165–68 (1996).
23. Rottner, 203 A.2d at 83.
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the firm was representing Twible in a collection matter against a third
24
party. The cases were not at all related, but the court still disqualified
25
the lawyer. The lawyer was representing Twible in one case while suing
him in another:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of
business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed
of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom
he looks as his advocate and his champion. If, as in this case, he is sued
and his home attached by his own attorney, who is representing him in
another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the
26
profession is exposed to the charge that it is interested only in money.

In IBM Corp. v. Levin, the court disqualified a law firm that
represented Levin in an antitrust case against IBM, because the law firm
27
was also occasionally writing labor law opinion letters for IBM. When
an IBM representative sought out the law firm, the firm told IBM that it
28
29
had filed suit against IBM. The IBM representative did not object. It is
obvious that IBM was neither a callow youth nor a befuddled widow, yet
30
the court still disqualified the law firm. The court was unwilling to
simply assume that IBM impliedly waived because it had constructive
notice was what was going on. In other words, it was clear that one part
of IBM (the IBM labor lawyers) knew it was hiring a law firm that
another part of IBM (the IBM lawyers handling IBM’s defense of the
antitrust action) knew was adverse to it in the antitrust case. This
constructive notice was insufficient to prevent disqualification because
the law firm did not bring home to IBM the significance of what it is
31
doing.
When an attorney represents one client in a suit against another,
“some ‘adverse effect’ on an attorney’s exercise of his independent
judgment on behalf of a client may result from the attorney’s adversary
32
posture toward that client in another matter.” The attorney’s efforts to

24. Id.
25. Id. at 84–85.
26. Id. at 84. The lawyer is a fiduciary and, as such, has the typical fiduciary obligation not to
breach the duty of loyalty owed to the principal. See Laurence S. Fordham, There Are Substantial
Limitations on Representation of Clients in Litigation Which Are Not Obvious in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus. Law. 1193, 1204 (1978); Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional
Responsibility, 45 Sw. L.J. 2035, 2036 (1992).
27. 579 F.2d 271, 275–76 (3d Cir. 1978); see also In re Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 540, 544–45 & n.7
(5th Cir. 1992) (citing Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 (1992)) (holding that no exceptional
circumstances allow a law firm to represent the plaintiffs in a class action antitrust suit against one of
the law firm’s current clients, whom the firm was simultaneously representing in two pending
lawsuits).
28. IBM, 579 F.2d at 276.
29. Id. at 276–77.
30. Id. at 281.
31. Id. at 281–82.
32. Id. at 280.

Rotunda_62-HLJ-677 (Do Not Delete)

684

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/4/2011 12:28 PM

[Vol. 62:677

please client A (or client B), might cause a “diminution in the vigor of his
33
representation of the client in the other matter.” The attorney owes
34
both clients “undivided loyalty.”
C. Imputing the Lawyer’s Duties of Respecting Client Confidences
and Client Loyalty
Imputation magnifies the reach of the lawyer’s duty to respect client
confidences and the lawyer’s duty of client loyalty. The basic principle is
that the ethics rules impute the lawyer’s individual disqualification to
35
every other lawyer in the same law firm.
The leading case illustrating the reach of imputation and
simultaneous representation of adverse interests is Cinema 5, Ltd. v.
36
Cinerama, Inc. The issue arose because a lawyer, Manly Fleischmann,
was a partner in two different law firms, one in New York City and one
37
in Buffalo. Through him, the court imputed all the conflicts of the
38
Buffalo firm to the New York City firm. The Buffalo law firm

33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976)).
35. Prior to 2009, the ABA Model Rules did not provide a screening option for attorneys moving
between private firms. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10 (2008). Under the old Rules, there
are various exceptions to imputed disqualification, none of which are applicable here. Id. R. 1.10.
There are also special provisions that apply to the revolving door between private practice and
government service. Id. R. 1.11. Under the pre-2009 rule, the law firm could remove the disqualification
by screening the disqualified lawyer from all participation in the matter in question, id., but this rule
did not apply in the case of lawyers moving from one private law firm to another. See id. R. 1.10(d).
The rationale was that public policy encourages the revolving door between the private and the
government spheres, but the same justifications do not apply to lawyers moving between private law
firms. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of Private Attorneys, 1
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 85 (1987) (explaining that the government wants to encourage lawyer mobility
between private practice and government service, wants its government lawyers to bring to the world
of private practice the government’s interest in effective law enforcement, wants its lawyers to have
experience in the private world, and recognizes that the profit motive that fuels the private world does
not apply to government decisionmaking).
In 2009, the ABA approved a new rule allowing limited screening in the case of lawyers
whose disqualification relates to association with a prior law firm. See Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.10(a)(2) (2010); Cassandra Melton, Model Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts and Private
Law Firm Screening, ABA Litig. News, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/
pretrial-model-rule-110.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Revised Recommendation 109 (2009) [hereinafter ABA Resolution 109], available at
http://www.abajournal.com/files/109Revised.pdf. This Rule does not deal with the problem that is the
focus of this Article. The ABA changes only deal with the issue of a lawyer’s duty to a former client
when moving from one law firm to another. Conflicts counsel focuses on the conflict caused by a law
firm simultaneously representing clients with conflicting interests. Whether this new ABA Rule will
have influence is unclear. The revised Rule 1.10(a)(2) “departs substantially from the rules in thirtynine jurisdictions,” as the Minority Report to the ABA Resolution makes clear. Id. at 9.
36. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Id. at 1385.
38. See id. at 1387.
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represented Cinerama, which was a defendant in an antitrust action in
39
40
upstate New York. Several theater operators were suing Cinerama.
Later, several plaintiffs retained the New York City firm to sue
several companies, including Cinerama, for alleged attempts to take over
theater companies in New York City as part of an effort to restrain
41
competition in New York City’s first-run motion picture theater market.
Hence, one law firm (where Fleischmann was a partner) was suing
Cinerama in New York City, while the other law firm (where
Fleischmann was also a partner) was defending Cinerama in upstate New
42
York. Because Fleischmann was the common partner in the two firms,
the court followed the standard imputation rule and treated the situation
as thought it were a single law firm representing its client in one case
43
while suing it in a different case.
Cinema 5 (whom Fleischmann’s upstate New York law firm
represented), appealed the disqualification, arguing that two different
cases in two completely different markets were involved and thus, that
the cases were not “substantially related,” in other words, that the law
firm did not learn confidences from one client that it could use against
44
another current client. The Second Circuit assumed that the cases were
45
46
not substantially related, but still, it ordered disqualification. Even
though there was no breach of client confidences, there was a breach of
“the duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his
47
clients.”
The court concluded that Cinerama was “entitled to feel that at least
48
until that litigation was at an end, it had his undivided loyalty,” and that
49
its lawyer would “accept no retainer” adverse to its interests.
Fleischmann’s New York City law firm owed similar duties to Cinema 5.
50
The court treated the two firms as one, because of the common partner.
Because the law firms were a single “firm” for imputation purposes, the

39. Id. at 1385.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1387.
44. Id. at 1385.
45. Id. at 1386.
46. Id. at 1387.
47. Id. at 1386. The court conceded that the “‘substantial relationship’ test is indeed the one that
we have customarily applied in determining whether a lawyer may accept employment against a
former client.” Id. But, the court noted that this “suit is not against a former client, but an existing
one.” Id.
48. Id. (citing Grievance Comm. of the Bar of Hartford Cnty. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn.
1964)).
49. Id. (quoting Loew v. Gillespie, 153 N.Y.S. 830, 832 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff’d, 157 N.Y.S. 1133
(App. Div. 1916)).
50. Id. at 1387.
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“firm” was in a conflict requiring disqualification, because a firm cannot
51
be loyal to competing clients. As the court said, “no man can serve two
52
masters.”
D. The Hot Potato Doctrine
One might think that the lawyer could solve the Cinema 5 problem
by converting the current client into a former client, and that Manly
Fleischmann and his law firm could have withdrawn from representing
Cinerama (the client who complained). However, the court rejected that
53
alternative, without offering any explanation. It noted, enigmatically, at
the end of its opinion that “after learning of the conflict which had
developed, the Jaeckle firm, through Mr. Fleischmann, offered to
withdraw its representation of Cinerama in the Western District actions.
However, that offer was not accepted, and Mr. Fleishmann continued,
54
albeit reluctantly, to have one foot in each camp.”
55
Lawyers can be adverse to former clients. Cinema 5, however, did
not explain why lawyers cannot convert a current client into a former
56
57
client by firing the client. The court simply did not allow it. The court
therefore disqualified the law firm that had its foot reluctantly stuck in
58
each camp.
The court’s instincts were correct, though it failed to explain its
rationale. This ethics rule flows from the law of agency: The lawyer is the
agent of the client, and therefore is a fiduciary. Lawyers, like all agents,
are fiduciaries of their principals. Agents cannot profit from violating
their fiduciary duties, so they cannot profit by picking a favored client
and firing the disfavored one, as that would breach the agent’s obligation
59
of loyalty to the principal. “A fiduciary should not be able to profit
60
from its breach of the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.”

51. Id. at 1386.
52. Id. (quoting Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); In re W.T. Byrns,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Va. 1966); Matthew 6:24).
53. See id. at 1387.
54. Id.
55. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9 (2010). Model Rule 1.7 is not as lenient as
Model Rule 1.9. A lawyer may not sue a current client, but, in general, a lawyer may sue a former
client subject to a few restrictions (such as not using confidential information against the former
client). Compare id. R. 1.7 (dealing with current clients), with id. R. 1.9 (dealing with former clients).
56. Cinema 5, 528 F.2d at 1387.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Kelly v. Greason, 244 N.E.2d 456, 460 (N.Y. 1968) (“[W]ith rare and conditional exceptions,
the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently,
affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship.”); Robert
C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, Attorney Conflicts of Interest, 2 Corp. L. Rev. 345 (1979); see also
Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 10-612, 2010 WL 3046586, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2010). In
Airgas, Inc., the court refused to dismiss a former client’s allegation that its former lawyer breached its
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As we have seen, the basic conflicts rule is that a lawyer may not sue
Client A on behalf of Client B while simultaneously representing Client
A, even in a completely unrelated matter. This rule exists in a world
where law firms are ever-changing. When law firms metamorphose by
merger or acquisition, their client lists may contain two clients who are
directly adverse to each other. Some law firms erroneously conclude that
the firm should pick the favored client, continue to represent it, and
withdraw from representing the other. However, the ethics rule is to the
contrary: If the firm withdraws from further representation of Client A,
61
it still may not ethically represent Client B.
If a law firm finds itself simultaneously representing two adverse
clients in two different law suits, it may not avoid the problem simply by
62
dropping the less lucrative client like a “hot potato.” If the parties do
not consent to the conflict, the law firm must withdraw from representing
63
both parties in the two cases, unless there are special circumstances
64
showing that the client, and not the law firm, caused the conflict.
The “hot potato” metaphor probably derives from Picker
65
International Inc. v. Varian Associates Inc. In that case, a large national
66
law firm merged with a smaller firm based in Chicago. When client lists
were compared, it turned out that the merging firms were representing
opponents in current, albeit separate, litigation and that the newly67
merged firm was thus in the position of suing a current client. The larger
firm was suing B on behalf of A, its longtime client; the smaller firm—
now part of the larger law firm—was representing B in various matters,
68
but not in the case of A versus B.
The newly-merged firm sought to withdraw from representing the
smaller firm’s client while continuing to represent the longtime client of

fiduciary duty when it dropped the client “like a hot potato” in an effort to cure a conflict of interest
by converting a current client into a former client. Id.
60. Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families,
72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 655, 664 (1997); see also Rotunda, supra note 16.
61. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 132 cmt. c (2000); Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a)(1), (b)(4) & cmt. 6 (2010) (stating that a lawyer may not represent a client
adverse to another client unless the affected client gives informed consent).
62. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 16.
63. Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d, 869
F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
64. For example, Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc. accepted the “hot potato” doctrine but still did
not require disqualification, because the client caused the conflict through a client merger. 85 F.R.D.
264, 272 (D. Del. 1980). In addition, given the timing of the merger, the court found that it was highly
unlikely that there could be a misuse of confidential information or any adverse effect on the
representation. Id.
65. Picker, 670 F. Supp. at 1365.
66. Id. at 1364–65.
67. Id. at 1365.
68. See id. at 1364.
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69

the larger firm. The court held that the firm could not do so without the
70
consent of all affected clients. Failing such consent, the new firm had to
withdraw from representing both parties: “A firm may not drop a client
like a hot potato, especially if it is in order to keep happy a far more
71
lucrative client.” From such colorful images the law of conflicts develops.
The general principles that the Picker court articulated are not
unusual, but the particular case was, and the trial court’s strict
application of the conflict rules was hardly self-evident. While the large
firm was representing Client A in a suit against Client B, none of the
lawyers, from either the new or the old law firms, had ever been involved
72
in that particular litigation on behalf of Client B.
Moreover, there may be a different result if we assume that the
rearrangement of the two law firms followed a different order. Assume
that the smaller firm had first disbanded and then withdrawn from
further representation of B, on the grounds that the law firm no longer
existed. Then, assume that the larger firm hired all—or most—of the
lawyers from the now-disbanded smaller firm. In that situation, it could
be said that the larger firm never had B as a client. Hence, there never
was a client to drop.
73
The Picker court did not credit that formalistic argument. Nor did
it credit the argument that the representation of Client A should be
allowed to go forward because the larger firm did not merge with the
74
smaller firm for the purpose of dropping the smaller client. There was
no claim that the lawyers ever had any intent to impose any extra costs
on the smaller client, or that there was ever any danger of a breach of
Client B’s confidences. The court was similarly unmoved by the contention
that a strict hot-potato rule reduces lawyer mobility and impedes
75
efficient restructuring in the legal profession. Although some courts
have been sensitive to such arguments in other contexts, the case law
76
before and after Picker remains unsympathetic in this context. Thus, it

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1365.
72. Id. at 1364. The Jones Day law firm represented Picker in this case. Id. The law firm of
McDougall, Hersh & Scott had represented Varian on various matters over the years (“including five
that [were] on-going”) but not in the current case. Id. For this litigation, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
and Fish & Neave represented Varian. Id.
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1366–67.
76. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386–87 (2d Cir. 1976); Harte
Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 655 F. Supp. 419, 421–22 (S.D. Fla. 1987); see also PioneerStandard Elecs., Inc. v. Cap Gemini Am., Inc., No. 1:01CV2185, 2002 WL 553460, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 11, 2002) (“Shearman’s termination of its relationship with Pioneer is ineffective because
Shearman terminated its attorney-client relationship with Pioneer only after it was asked to represent
Cap Gemini in this litigation and Pioneer refused to waive the conflict.”).
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is clear that a law firm cannot avoid its obligation to disqualify itself by
dropping the disfavored client.
E. Waiver
The basic scenario we are discussing involves only a violation of
duty of loyalty, not a violation of the duty of confidentiality. The
question is whether the law should disqualify the law firm from
representing the new client when the two matters are unrelated, and
there is no confidence in either case that is relevant to the other. That is,
Law Firm represents Client #1 in one case while representing Client #2 in
another case that is completely different and unrelated. Law Firm does
not know any confidences or secrets of Client #1 that are relevant to
Client #1’s litigation adverse to Client #2.
In general, a party can waive the duty of loyalty that a law firm owes
77
78
it. Parties can even waive a conflict in advance. If both parties do not
mind that the law firm is representing each of them in different
79
litigations, the problem virtually disappears. The parties have consented.
No one is complaining, and it is rare that the court will hold, sua sponte,
80
that the clients cannot waive the conflict.
But, that is not what often happens in reality. In practice, Client #2
does not consent to that situation. Client #2 may be quite reasonably
concerned that Law Firm, in an effort to please Client #1, may reduce the
81
vigor of its representation of Client #2. Client #2, who is separately
represented by its own counsel, may not consent, because there are
advantages in litigation to forcing the other side to retain new counsel.
That imposes expenses on the adversary and often leads to delay, which
may well favor Client #2. Or, Client #1 may discover, as the litigation
proceeds, that she must question a witness who is also a client of the Law
Firm. A partner, in the Law Firm, while representing Client #1, may be
less likely to argue that the witness she is cross-examining is lacking in
candor, if that witness is also a client of the same Law Firm. Client #1 is
concerned but is also reluctant to change law firms so close to trial. Or,
Client #1 will decide to waive the conflict, but Client #2 may not.

77. Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, § 1.7-4(a).
78. This issue is carefully discussed in, Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 289 (2000); see also Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, § 1.7-4(b).
79. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 (b)(4) (2010). There are a few situations where even
consent would not cure a conflict—when no disinterested lawyer would believe that the lawyer can
competently represent the interests of each. See id. R. 1.7(b)(1)–(3). Rule 1.7(b)(3) does prevent the
same lawyer from suing the current client in the same litigation, even with client consent, but that is
not happening here because Law Firm #2 will be handling that matter. See id. R. 1.7(b)(3).
80. See Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 2, at 85 & n.16; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.7(b)(4) & cmt. 18 (2010).
81. IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978).
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Nonetheless, in such a scenario, we know that the Law Firm must
82
disqualify itself, unless both clients consent to the conflict. The Law
Firm cannot avoid this conflict by having a different law partner crossexamine Client #2. Nor can the Law Firm avoid this problem by
83
dropping the disfavored client like a hot potato.
In short, longstanding ethics rules, case law, and policy concerns
justify these disqualification requirements. Yet, there is one class of cases
where the law requires disqualification, but the sound policy reasons do
not. Let us now turn to that topic.

II. Conflicts Counsel
In various decisions, often unreported, courts are approving a
client’s retention of conflicts counsel in order to avoid disqualifying the
law firm for one of the parties. We see this development primarily in
cases where the law firm that is the subject of the disqualification is
involved with cross-examination of an adverse witness, or discovery of a
third party, or efforts to collect assets on behalf of a bankruptcy estate. In
each of these instances, using conflicts counsel protects the interests of
one current client while avoiding disqualification of the law firm that
represents another current client.
A. Introduction
Let us reconsider the basic scenario that we have been discussing,
but with a caveat. Law Firm represents Client #1, which finds herself
adverse to Client #2. Law Firm represents Client #2 in other, unrelated
matters, but a different law firm represents Client #2 in the particular
matter that leads to the adversity. For example, Law Firm represents
Client #1 in a patent dispute with Client #2, and that same Law Firm
represents Client #2 in a real estate dispute with a third party. Client #1
and Client #2 are both clients of Law Firm, which must therefore
disqualify itself if the clients do not waive the conflict. That is the
standard rule. But there is a coda or addendum to this basic scenario.
Assume that Law Firm is representing Client #1 in a matter, but
only a portion of that matter is adverse to Client #2. Assume further that
this portion of the matter that involves Client #2 is discrete and separable
from the rest of the matter. For example, in the course of representing
Client #1 in a case adverse to a third party, the Law Firm may decide that
82. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 132 cmt. c (2000) (“If a lawyer is
approached by a prospective client seeking representation in a matter adverse to an existing client, the
present-client conflict may not be transformed into a former-client conflict by the lawyer’s withdrawal
from the representation of the existing client. A premature withdrawal violates the lawyer’s obligation
of loyalty to the existing client and can constitute a breach of the client-lawyer contract of
employment.” (internal citation omitted)).
83. See supra Part I.D.
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it is necessary to depose or cross-examine Client #2. Client #2 is not a
party to this lawsuit but would be an adverse witness. The question is
whether Law Firm can avoid disqualification if Client #1 hires separate
counsel to represent it in this discrete portion of the case. The conflicts
rules do not talk about dividing cases into discrete, severable parts, but
that does not mean that severability is a bad idea.
Disqualifying counsel places burdens on the judicial system, for
there is typically a delay when the party has to hire another law firm to
handle the matter. In addition, disqualification places burdens on the
client not able to retain counsel of choice. Disqualification also imposes
financial costs on the client who must reeducate the new lawyer who
84
replaces the old one. If there are good reasons to disqualify counsel,
then we accept the burdens that disqualification imposes. But there
should be good reasons. If the legal system can respect the client’s
legitimate expectation of loyalty without disqualifying the law firm, then
disqualification becomes unnecessary and expensive.
If a way exists to protect a client’s legitimate expectation of loyalty
without disqualifying the law firm, then the law should disfavor
disqualification, because it would impose burdens without the
compensating benefits. Emerging case law implements what I call
85
“conflicts counsel.” This new counsel would represent the client on a
discrete, easily severable matter. The courts do not always label what
they are doing, and often do not discuss why they are doing it. Yet, a few
courts sometimes allow law firms to use conflicts counsel to comply with
the ethics rules while protecting a client’s expectation of loyalty and
reducing, rather than exacerbating, litigation costs. Other courts do not
even talk about the issue. Advisory ethics opinions acknowledge that a
law firm, in its engagement latter, can limit its representation to a
86
discrete issue. However, conflicts counsel is a little different because the

84. White v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 3:09-CV-2484-G, 2010 WL 2473833, at *3
(N.D. Tex. June 15, 2010) (noting that courts must consider additional factors, including whether
disqualification would impose a financial burden on the client if it were necessary to find new counsel).
85. We find evidence that some public defenders are using conflicts counsel to take care of cases
where the public defender’s office cannot represent a criminal defendant. Humboldt County, California
has created a “conflict counsel.” See Humboldt County Conflict Counsel, http://co.humboldt.ca.us/
confcsel/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). While the use of conflicts counsel in this situation, generally, flies
under the radar of court decisions, it has not escaped the attention of private criminal defense lawyers
who are objecting to the potential loss of business. See Gideon, Lawyers at War over Conflict Counsel,
Public Defender Stuff, http://pdstuff.apublicdefender.com/2007/09/18/lawyers-at-war-over-conflictcounsel (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (noting that the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
urged Florida’s Attorney General to block a July 1, 2007 law that established five Regional Conflict
Counsels who would act as public defenders for indigent criminal defendants when the regular Public
Defender had a conflict).
86. The D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee also concluded that a lawyer, in order to avoid a client
conflict, may limit the scope of an engagement to a discrete legal issue or to a stage in litigation:
[B]y agreeing only to represent a client as to a discrete legal issue or with respect to a
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decision to use a conflicts counsel comes later, when the possible conflict
manifests itself—after the client approved of the engagement letter.
B. Adverse Witnesses and Discovery
One situation that invites the use of conflicts counsel involves the
case where the lawyer on behalf of one client cross-examines a current
client as an adverse witness. Assume that a lawyer, “Law Firm #1,”
represents Client #1 in a matter. Law Firm #1, in the course of litigation,
cross-examines another individual, Client #2, who is another client of the
same firm, as an adverse witness. Because Client #2 is a material witness,
Law Firm #1 will ordinarily face a disqualifying conflict of interest unless
there is appropriate client consent, even if the law firm’s representation
of Client #1 is completely unrelated to the law firm’s representation of
Client #2.
The general rule is that this situation is a conflict that disqualifies
87
the lawyer. This general rule is certainly justified. There is a risk that
the lawyer may have secret information that she could use in cross88
examining her client, even if the cases are unrelated. The lawyer may
know, for example, that the witness will become extremely nervous and
embarrassed if asked about her medication, so that the witness will look
like she is lying even when telling the truth. Moreover, even if there is no
risk of a loss of confidentiality, there is a risk of a breach of loyalty. The
lawyer’s pecuniary interest in possible future business from Client #2
may cause her to avoid vigorous cross-examination that might embarrass
or offend the witness. If the lawyer does engage in vigorous crossexamination, that witness will feel betrayed, because her own lawyer is
the one who is challenging her recollection.
Yet, there is an alternative that avoids disqualification without
compromising the legitimate expectations of either client. The ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow a lawyer to “limit the scope
of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
89
circumstances, and the client gives informed consent.” In our witness

discrete stage in the litigation, a lawyer may be able to limit the scope of the representation
such that the new matter is not substantially related to the prior matter. Restrictions on the
scope of the representation that effectively ensure that there is no substantial risk that
confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior
representation would be useful or relevant to advance the client’s position in the new matter
may, under certain circumstances, be sufficient to avoid a conflict of interest.
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 343 (2008), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics/opinions/opinion343.cfm.
87. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2010); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-367 (1992); see also Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, § 1.7-6(c).
88. See Chugach Elec. Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 443–44 (9th Cir. 1966).
89. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(c) (2010); see also Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 121 (2000).
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scenario, if the lawyer, in representing Client #1, learns that she may
have to depose and cross-examine Client #2, the lawyer can agree with
Client #1 that her representation will exclude a discrete and severable
issue: the questioning of Client #2. Client #1 would hire another law firm
to handle this discrete matter. If Client #1 agrees to that limitation,
Client #2 could not force the disqualification of the Law Firm, because
the Law Firm will not be adverse to Client #2, even if Client #2 does not
consent.
Over thirty years ago—before the ABA Model Rules even
existed—Judge (later Justice) Stevens suggested this approach in United
90
States v. Jeffers. This case may be the first case to use a conflicts counsel.
Stevens acknowledged that “ethical considerations inhibited” the
lawyer’s ability “to interrogate the witness thoroughly, or his willingness
to permit another member of his firm to do so,” but then said, without
any discussion, that the lawyer should have “made an offer to have some
91
other lawyer retained for this limited purpose.”
While he offered no reasoning to support his suggestion, his
proposal was not merely formalistic. Client #1 would not, and could not,
consent to any limitation that he believed would cause his lawyer to act
incompetently. Client #1 simply hires two law firms. Law Firm #1 would
be responsible for most of the case and Law Firm #2 (the conflicts
counsel) would be responsible for cross-examining the witness. Client #2
does not want Law Firm #1, her lawyer on other matters, to use secrets
against her or be disloyal to her. However, Law Firm #1 will not be
revealing any secrets of Client #2 or breaching any duty of loyalty to
Client #2, because it will not handle the discrete matter that involves
Client #2. Instead, a different law firm—Law Firm #2—will be handling
that discrete matter. Because Law Firm #1 has nothing to do with this
discrete matter, it will not be disloyal to Client #2. Remember, that
Client #2 is not a party in the case involving Client #1; she is just a
92
witness. Client #2 will have her own lawyer representing her, and the

90. 520 F.2d 1256, 1264–66 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.) (analyzing the ethical implications of
counsel’s failure to cross-examine a former client).
91. Id. at 1266. Similarly, the court in United States v. Agosto approved of using what it called
“backup” counsel to avoid the conflict in criminal cases. 675 F.2d 965, 974 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing
Jeffers, 520 F.2d at 1266; Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal
Cases, 67 Geo. L.J. 1075, 1115 (1979)).
92. The courts will not impute to the conflicts counsel the knowledge that Law Firm #1 has.
Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 541–43 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusing to disqualify main counsel
following the disqualification of his local counsel); Am. Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125,
1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by rule, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(b) (1982), as
recognized in Wade v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Ala. 2002)
(reversing a trial court order imputing local counsel’s disqualification to a co-counsel firm serving as
trial counsel); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-367 (1992)
(approving of the Jeffers proposal of using conflicts counsel).
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lawyer examining Client #2 will not be Law Firm #1 but a different
lawyer, not at all connected with Law Firm #1.
A related issue deals with discovery. A lawyer who represents Client
#1 may well have to conduct third-party discovery of Client #2. This
raises a conflict even if the lawyer is searching for documents and does
93
not expect to cross-examine her client. The trial judge might also join
multiple cases for purposes of discovery only, or for all purposes, because
of efficiency and consistency. The lawyer for one client may find that she
is engaged in discovery of another client, who is separately represented
in the matter.
An unpublished case that focuses on this issue is Sumitomo Corp. v.
94
J.P. Morgan & Co. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (“Paul
Weiss”) was representing Sumitomo in investigating an employee who
95
was responsible for losses from copper trading. Later, Sumitomo
received demands for payment from over forty banks with respect to
96
transactions of which it was unaware. Paul Weiss realized that it
97
represented some of those banks. Hence, it told Sumitomo that—with
respect to those banks who were Paul Weiss clients—it could not
98
evaluate or litigate the bank claim on Sumitomo’s behalf. In other cases
where the banks were not clients, Paul Weiss would represent
99
Sumitomo. Thus, Paul Weiss represented Sumitomo in filing suit against
J.P. Morgan.
But Paul Weiss could not represent Sumitomo in its suit against
Chase Manhattan (“Chase”), because Chase was a Paul Weiss client in
100
other matters. Paul Weiss sought a limited waiver from Chase to permit
Paul Weiss to evaluate Sumitomo’s potential claims against Chase and to
discuss any valid claims with Chase before Sumitomo commenced
101
litigation. Chase refused. Sumitomo then retained a different law firm
to represent it in evaluating that claim and filing a separate suit against
102
Chase.

93. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-367 (1992) (“It
will . . . frequently be the case that a lawyer’s taking discovery, whether testimonial or documentary,
on behalf of one client, of a third party who is also a client, will present such direct adverseness, so as
to be disqualifying under Rule 1.7(a).”).
94. Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., Nos. 99 Civ. 8780(JSM), 99 Civ. 4004(JSM), 2000 WL
145747 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000).
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *1–2.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Paul Weiss continued to represent Chase in other matters, but not in
103
the case that Sumitomo brought against Chase. Thus, out of the two
cases (one against J.P. Morgan and one against Chase), Paul Weiss was
104
involved in only the first. At that point, the two lawsuits were separate.
However, the judge, at Chase’s request, consolidated the two cases for
105
106
pretrial discovery. Thus, the two cases became one. As a result, Chase
moved to disqualify Paul Weiss from representing Sumitomo and from
107
suing J.P. Morgan.
The Court rejected the motion and refused to disqualify Paul
108
Weiss. There was no conflict, because Sumitomo had employed special
conflicts counsel:
Paul Weiss is not representing Sumitomo against Chase in this
litigation in violation of [New York Code] DR 5-105. Instead, Paul
Weiss is representing Sumitomo against Morgan, a non-client, while [a
different law firm] Kronish Lieb is representing Sumitomo against
Chase, Paul Weiss’ current client in an unrelated matter. Thus, the per
se rule against simultaneous representation articulated in Cinema 5 and
109
other decisions does not require the Court to disqualify Paul Weiss.

Again, the court did not explain its reasoning or offer any further
detail, but its conclusion is sound. This second law firm, Kronish Lieb
Weiner & Hellman LLP (“Kronish Lieb”), became the conflicts
counsel—the lawyer that the client retains to avoid a disqualification of
the client’s other lawyer.
The court’s rule protects the interests of both clients. First, there is
Sumitomo. Sumitomo surely did not believe that Paul Weiss would not
represent its interests vigorously out of a desire to please its other client,
Chase. If it had, it would not have hired Paul Weiss.
Chase, the other client, had two interests worth protecting. First, it
had its interest in client confidentiality. Kronish Lieb, a different law
firm, representing Sumitomo in the sub-matter, served to protect Chase’s
interest in confidentiality, because Kronish Lieb was never a lawyer for
Chase and was not privy to its secrets. However, one might argue that

103. Id.
104. Id. at *1 (noting that Sumitomo brought two actions, one against Chase Manhattan and the
other against J.P. Morgan).
105. Id. at *1 n.1.
106. See id.
107. Id. at *2 (“Chase moved for disqualification of Paul Weiss, advancing two arguments.
First, . . . upon consolidation of the Morgan action and the Chase action, disqualification is appropriate
because . . . Paul Weiss’ representation of Sumitomo would involve Paul Weiss representing one client
who was suing another client in a consolidated action. Second, Chase contended that even if the cases
were not consolidated, disqualification is warranted because although Chase was not a party to the
litigation in which Paul Weiss was representing Sumitomo, Paul Weiss’ representation would adversely
affect Chase.”).
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *4.
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Paul Weiss could violate its ethical duties and leak secret information to
Kronish Lieb. That argument, if accepted, may prove too much: If Paul
Weiss wanted to violate its duties of confidentiality, it need not be
counsel of record in the J.P. Morgan matter to do so.
On the other hand, telling Chase that there are other ways for Paul
Weiss to act improperly is cold comfort. More significantly, the court
explained, Paul Weiss did not have any relevant privileged information
110
concerning Chase obtained through its prior representation of Chase.
The lack of relevant confidential information is pivotal: Paul Weiss could
not be giving Sumitomo an unfair advantage by using confidential
111
information from Chase, because it had no such information. Chase did
not have an interest in confidentiality. It only had an interest in loyalty;
that is, it had an interest that its own lawyer not be adverse to it.
The judge’s ruling protected that second interest—that Chase has a
right to expect loyalty from its lawyer, Paul Weiss. Chase had every right
to expect Paul Weiss not to represent a party against it, but Paul Weiss
was not doing that. Paul Weiss was representing Sumitomo against other
banks, not against Chase. Sumitomo hired a separate law firm to bring
that case. And, to make the point that the issues were clearly severable,
consider the following: The only reason the two cases were treated as
one is that the court consolidated them for convenience—at the request
112
of Chase. In Sumitomo, for example, there were suits against dozens of
banks, and the new counsel simply handled one discrete law suit against
113
Chase.
Of course, Sumitomo had the expense of hiring Paul Weiss, and the
additional expense of hiring Kronish Lieb. But Sumitomo was not
complaining; only Chase was complaining. Still, because of that problem,
when a law firm plans to divide the case in this way, it should document
what it is doing very clearly so that the client understands she is paying
for separate counsel due to a problem the law firm has, not a problem
inherent to the client’s case. Sumitomo could certainly replace Paul
Weiss entirely, but that is not what it wanted to do, and the court
correctly allowed the alternative that Sumitomo chose.
C. Bankruptcy and Conflicts Counsel
Bankruptcy offers another opportunity for the use of conflicts
counsel to lessen the costs of litigation. The economic cycle of boom and
bust is an inevitable byproduct of capitalism. And matching the cycle is
countercyclical behavior for anyone engaged in economic activity,
110. Id. at *3 n.3.
111. Id. at *3.
112. See id. at *1.
113. Id. (referring to Sumitomo’s possible disputes involving over forty major banks and financial
institutions).
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including lawyers. While many law firms are laying off partners and
associates in some areas of the law, other areas are booming. Bankruptcy
is one such area.
Lawyers representing the bankrupt business operate with the happy
knowledge that their fees are more secure than the most secured
115
creditor. The bankruptcy judge is supposed to make sure of that. While
the lawyers’ fees are certain, we know by the iron law of mathematics
that every dollar that goes to the lawyer is one less dollar to pay to a
116
creditor. Hence, the law should not impose rules that unnecessarily
increase lawyers’ fees. That would hurt creditors.
Costs associated with hiring new counsel are certainly justified when
disqualification serves important purposes. Typically, disqualification
protects a client’s legitimate expectations of client loyalty and client
117
confidences. However, it is incorrect to think that ethics is like money,
and that more is better than less. More is better than less at zero cost. So
it is with professional responsibility. More is better than less, unless the
118
costs exceed the benefits. One circumstance where the costs do not
justify the disqualification in bankruptcy is when the firm that is subject
to the disqualification motion has not violated any legitimate client
expectation of loyalty or confidence.
Let us focus on a primary issue of legal ethics related to conflicts of
interest and bankruptcy representation. There are various scenarios, and
they can be complex. But, in each one, a law firm, “Law Firm,”
represents a party, “Party #1,” in connection with a bankruptcy. Party #2
is an unsecured or secured creditor of the estate or a prospective lender
to the estate. Party #2 is also a client of Law Firm, but Law Firm
represents Party #2 only in unrelated matters, that is, matters that do not

114. “Laying off” is the common term used in the news reports, and I adopt it, although it is a
misnomer. Lawyers are not like members of the pipefitters union; we do not expect the law firms to
call back its laid-off partners when the economy improves.
115. The judge must approve fee awards, which may be contested, and on occasion, a judge will
independently view the amount requested as too high and reject the request. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)
(2006) (authorizing the bankruptcy court “on its own motion” to “award compensation that is less
than” that requested); see, e.g., In re Recycling Indus., Inc., 243 B.R. 396, 402–05 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2000) (holding that billing for work of summer associates was excessive as to time spent and as to
hourly rate).
116. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. Bus. & Tech.
L. 263, 266 (2010) (“[T]here’s significant overstaffing and duplication of effort—especially in the larger
bankruptcy cases. What’s worse is that there’s no easy way to pinpoint just where the overstaffing is
occurring in each case and no easy way to tell when the duplication of effort is necessary to represent
the clients’ interests and when it’s just simple ‘me, too’ make-work.”(footnote omitted)).
117. See, e.g., Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, §§ 1.6-1(b), 1.6-5, 1.8-3.
118. For example, the American Bar Association, in February 2009, amended its rules regarding
imputed disqualification, because it found that the costs outweighed the benefits. See ABA
Resolution 109, supra note 35. One can certainly dispute the weighing of the competing interests, but
the important point is that all the parties concerned recognized that they must weigh the costs and
benefits. See Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, § 1.10-4.
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involve the bankruptcy litigation. Party #2 uses a different law firm in the
bankruptcy litigation—not an uncommon occurrence when major
corporations hire various law firms to represent them on different
matters.
There are four major variations, all of which raise possible conflicts
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
 Law Firm is the attorney for the debtor or trustee in a U.S.
bankruptcy.
 Law Firm is the attorney for a Creditors’ Committee in a U.S.
bankruptcy.
 A member of Law Firm is the trustee of a liquidating trust
created because of a U.S. bankruptcy, or a plan administrator
under a plan of reorganization.
 Law Firm represents one creditor in its claims against the
bankruptcy estate, while other law firms represent other
creditors. One or more of these other creditors are also clients of
Law Firm in unrelated matters.
In each situation, Party #2 is an unsecured or secured creditor of the
estate or a prospective lender to the estate. And, in each of these
situations, Law Firm would not be taking positions adverse to Party #2
(its client in unrelated matters) because, in each case, a different law firm
(Law Firm #2) would be representing the debtor or trustee in a U.S.
bankruptcy, or a Creditors’ Committee in a U.S. bankruptcy, and so on.
In other words, Law Firm represents Party #1 in various matters.
Sometimes, the interests of Party #1 may conflict with the interests of
Party #2. In those cases, Law Firm does not represent Party #1. Instead,
Law Firm #2 represents Party #1 in the portion of the matter or
negotiation that is adverse to Party #2.
The question is whether Law Firm may ethically represent Party #1
(its client), provided that Law Firm #2 represents Party #1 in any
situation where Party #1 has an interest adverse to Party #2 (a client of
Law Firm in unrelated matters). Law Firm will not assist Law Firm #2 in
these matters. In that way, Law Firm will never be in a position where it
is adverse to a current client.
In addition to the ethics rules, which courts routinely enforce by
disqualifying the law firm, there is also the issue of the propriety of the
representation under bankruptcy law. If Congress enacts a law—such as a
bankruptcy law—that prohibits representation for reasons that Congress
deems sufficient, the ethics rules, which are rules of the court, do not
override the legislative determination. Obviously, state and federal courts
must follow valid federal statutes, even if those statutes are inconsistent
119
with state ethics rules.

119. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963). Although state ethics rules
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Bankruptcy law incorporates, to some extent, the rules of ethics. If
there is an ethical violation, the courts are more likely to find a violation
of the bankruptcy laws, and if there is no violation of the ethics rules, the
bankruptcy court is more likely to find no violation of the bankruptcy
121
laws. Hence, it is doubly important to determine whether there is a
conflict under the ethics rules governing lawyers.
As discussed above, one’s first view of the basic law governing
disqualification is that there is a conflict of interests in each of these
various scenarios. But, if one looks more closely, a law firm can avoid the
disqualification if it uses a conflicts counsel in the situations listed. In
those circumstances, public policy, legitimate client expectations, and the
emerging case law indicate that there is no valid conflict of interest.
In several cases, the bankruptcy courts have noted the use of
conflicts counsel and apparently approved of the idea, though they often
122
do not discuss the rationale. Daido Steel Co. v. Official Comm. of
123
Unsecured Creditors is one such case. The official committee of
unsecured creditors asked the bankruptcy court to approve retaining a
law firm in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, even though the law firm was
simultaneously representing (on unrelated matters) one of the
124
purchasers of the debtor’s assets. Daido, the single largest creditor,

did not allow nonlawyers to appear before various agencies, including the Patent Court, federal law
did allow nonlawyers to appear before the Patent Court. Id. Because of the federal law authorizing an
appearance by a nonlawyer, Sperry held that the Supremacy Clause overrode state rules to the
contrary. Id. at 384–85; see also 1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law: Substance and Procedure §§ 3.1–3.3 (4th ed. 2007).
120. E.g., In re GHR Energy Corp., 60 B.R. 52, 61 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (“In deciding whether
the McCabe/Gordon firm, by hiring Christie, holds an interest adverse to the estate [for bankruptcy
law purposes], the Court has looked for guidance to the Code of Professional Responsibility.”); see
also In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034(AJG), 2002 WL 32034346, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23,
2002) (quoting In re Caldor, Inc., 193 B.R. 165, 178 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)), aff’d, No. 02 Civ.
5638(BSJ), 2003 WL 223455 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003); In re Caldor, Inc., 193 B.R. 165, 178 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Courts look to the Code of Professional Responsibility in analyzing conflicts under
the Bankruptcy Code.”).
121. See, e.g., Enron, 2003 WL 223455, at *9 (“This Court concurs with the bankruptcy court that,
having found both that Milbank is not involved in any matter in which it has an adverse interest and
that the use of conflicts counsel and ethical walls are appropriate, there is no basis for a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.”).
122. See Calpine Corp. v. Rosetta Resources Inc. (In re Calpine Corp.), 377 B.R. 808, 810 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 370 B.R. 552, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Rockaway
Bedding, Inc., No. 07-14890, 2007 WL 1461319, at *2, *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 14, 2007); Bayou
Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 639
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In
re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, app. A, at 149 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
326 B.R. 853, 855 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726, 728 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003). As discussed below, the law does not limit the use of conflicts counsel to bankruptcy
cases.
123. 178 B.R. 129 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
124. Id. at 130.
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objected based on a conflict of interest. The Brouse & McDowell law
126
firm (“B&M”) represented the Committee. Later, Hamlin Holding,
Inc. (“HHI”) “entered into negotiations with the debtors for the
127
purchase of substantially all of their assets.” B&M also represented
128
HHI, but on matters unrelated to the bankruptcy. Separate counsel
129
represented HHI on the bankruptcy matter. The court found that the
130
bankruptcy statute did not prohibit representation of the committee by
the law firm that also represented the purchaser of debtor’s assets on
131
The court specifically did not
matters unrelated to bankruptcy.
consider the legal ethics issues, although it did find that the law firm did
not have an “adverse interest” within the meaning of the relevant
132
bankruptcy statute.
133
In re Rockaway Bedding, Inc. also approved of using conflicts
counsel to avoid the conflict. However, that case considered the ethics
134
rules. The Rockaway Bedding court found no violation of either the
135
bankruptcy law or the ethics rules governing the practice of law. It also
136
used the term “conflicts counsel.” Again, it offered little by way of
137
discussing the rationale.
The law firm in question, Duane Morris LLP, “agreed not to assert
any claim of fraud, misrepresentation or dishonest conduct against PNC
138
Bank in connection with the Debtors’ Chapter 11 proceedings.” If a
claim should arise, Duane Morris LLP offered to “retain separate
conflicts counsel to pursue such claims or allow the Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors to assert such claims on the Debtors’ behalf. In
the event that a dispute arises between the Debtors and Mr. Potamkin,
all parties will be represented by counsel other than Duane Morris
139
LLP.” The waiver excluded “[m]atters relating to misrepresentations
and fraud,” which would “be assigned to either conflicts counsel or the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to prosecute on the Debtors’
140
behalf.” Given this arrangement, the court found no conflict: “Given

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (2006).
Daido Steel, 178 B.R. at 131–32.
Id.
No. 07-14890, 2007 WL 1461319 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 14, 2007).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2, *4.
See id. at *4–5.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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the prophylactic provisions in place, this Court also believes that Duane
Morris LLP’s representation is in accordance with New Jersey Rule of
141
Professional Conduct 1.7.”
In re Enron similarly found no violation of the bankruptcy law or
142
legal ethics. A creditor, Exco, moved to disqualify a law firm, Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (“Milbank”), from representing the
143
unsecured creditors’ committee in Enron’s Chapter 11 cases. Milbank
argued that it was not simultaneously representing the Committee along
with any other party to the Chapter 11 case with an interest adverse to
144
145
the bankruptcy estate. The client had hired separate counsel for that.
146
The Court agreed and used the term “conflicts counsel.”
Two of the members of the official committee of the unsecured
147
creditors were significant clients of Milbank. Milbank also represented
numerous other creditors on matters unrelated to the Enron bankruptcy
148
case. Another committee member, a surety, was a plaintiff in a lawsuit
alleging that the two committee members who were alleged clients of
149
Milbank conspired with others to defraud the surety. Prior to the
Chapter 11 filing, Milbank represented entities who had arranged for a
150
billion dollar structured finance offering on behalf of a debtor affiliate.
This offering included issuance of the debtor’s stock and an agreement to
151
sell that stock. In the five years prior to the Chapter 11 filing, Milbank
represented several of the debtors in 125 transactions and collected
152
almost $18 million in legal fees. Additionally, the debtors had paid
nearly a half-million dollars in fees to Milbank during the preference
153
period. Milbank did not voluntarily repay the preference, but it did
agree not to defend a preference action and to abide by the findings of a
154
court-appointed examiner. Still, there was no conflict, because on all
155
The
relevant issues, Milbank used a separate conflicts counsel.
141. Id. at *5.
142. No. 01-16034(AJG), 2002 WL 32034346, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002), aff’d, No. 02
Civ. 5638(BSJ), 2003 WL 223455 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *9.
146. Id. at *11 (“There is no basis in this record to question the adequacy of this procedure or the
internal ethical walls established at Milbank. Conflicts counsel, limited engagement agreements, and
ethical walls have been acceptable procedures to address conflict of interests issues.”).
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *8.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *10.
153. Id. at *9–10.
154. Id. at *10; see also Michael P. Richman, Mega-Case Conflict Issues: Enron Committee Counsel,
Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Sept. 2002, at 20, 32.
155. Id. at *10–11.
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creditors’ committee used this second law firm, the conflicts counsel, to
handle matters that Milbank or its clients on other matters might have a
156
conflict of interests.
Consider another scenario, where Law Firm represents one creditor
in its claims against the bankruptcy estate, while other law firms
represent other creditors. One or more of these other creditors are also
clients of Law Firm in unrelated matters. The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not regard this situation as raising what it calls
157
“directly adverse” conflicts. The comments do not really offer any
litmus test to determine what is “direct” versus “indirect,” but the ABA
158
does give a few examples. If a lawyer represents clients who are
competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, that “does not
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require
159
consent of the respective clients.” In other words, a law firm may
represent a water utility in its efforts to raise its rates although that
representation, if successful, disadvantages all of Law Firm’s other clients
160
who use water. Or, Law Firm may represent the local Toyota car dealer
in buying some real estate while simultaneously representing the local
161
Mercedes dealer in a contract matter. “The representations and the
clients have nothing to do with each other, even though the clients are
162
competitors in the business world.”
In the same sense, the creditors are all competitors for the assets of
the estate, but that does not mean that they will be suing each other. Law
Firm will be representing its client, while other creditors will have their
own counsel to represent their interests. There is no disqualifying conflict
merely because members of a Creditors Committee assert claims in
163
differing amounts and subject to differing potential setoffs.
156. The district court approved this resolution of the issue. Exco Resources, Inc. v. Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (In re Enron Corp.), No. 02 Civ. 5638(BSJ), 2003 WL 223455
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
157. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010).
158. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
159. Id.
160. Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, § 1.7-3(c).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The court in In re Rusty Jones, Inc. concluded, on the facts of that case, that the law firm may
represent both the creditors’ committee and individual creditors unless there is a showing of actual
conflict of interest. 107 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). The court added:
Individual members of this Creditors Committee assert claims in differing amounts and
subject to differing potential setoffs. However, that does not create an adverse interest
which would prohibit one counsel from representing individual members of the committee
and also the committee as a whole when all members of the committee share claims of a
similar nature. In short, no adverse interests have been demonstrated here between
individual members of the Committee represented by Hinshaw and the Committee as a
whole.
Id.
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Thus, In re National Liquidators, Inc. held that concurrent
representation of an unsecured creditors’ committee and individual
unsecured creditors is permissible unless there is an actual dispute:
It simply exceeds rational bounds to rule that an adverse interest
exists merely because a committee member’s or a creditor’s transactions
with the debtor will be investigated, or because a remote, speculative,
hypothetical possibility exists that, in the future, the estate or the
Committee may dispute the creditor’s claim or bring a cause of action
164
against the creditor.

However, there may be other cases where one creditor takes an
adverse action against another creditor in the same matter. If there is an
actual dispute, then there should be a conflict. As the court in National
Liquidators explained:
[S]ection 1103(b)’s bar to attorney representation includes a
requirement that there exist some allegation or evidence suggesting the
likelihood of some actual dispute, strife, discord, or difference between
the committee and its constituent or member. The Court is not
establishing a high threshold. For example, should any evidence
suggest the existence of possible challenges to a creditor’s claim, the
existence of a possible recovery action against the creditor, or the
existence of any possible dispute between a committee and one of its
constituents or members, then a disqualifying adverse interest exists
under the Bankruptcy Code. Undoubtedly, actual disputes or actual
allegations of the need for a recovery action engender adverse
interests. Speculation and hypothesizing, however, will not carry the
165
day.

Thus, an impermissible conflict would exist if the lawyer who had
previously represented Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession then defended
fraudulent transfer claims against the corporation. If the lawyer learned
confidential information disclosed during his prior representation, then
the lawyer would be “in a position to take advantage of information
previously revealed to him by the debtors as debtors-in-possession in an
effort to frustrate and hinder the duties of the trustee and former
debtors-in-possession to administer the bankruptcy estate for the benefit
166
of all creditors therein.” The fraudulent transfer claims that the lawyer
then attempted to defend would be the same fraudulent transfer claims
that the Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession were obligated to assert prior
167
to the conversion to Chapter 11.

164. 182 B.R. 186, 192 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)..
165. Id. at 192–93 (citing Badami v. K.E. Joy, P.C. (In re Joy), 175 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1994)).
166. Badami v. K.E. Joy, P.C. (In re Joy), 175 B.R. 303, 306 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994)
167. E.g., id. at 305 (“This interest and duty to prosecute claims against K.E. Joy P.C. on behalf of
the estate is adverse to the interest of K.E. Joy P.C. in retaining funds transferred to it by the
debtors.”).
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Consider these various cases. Law Firm #1 is the attorney for the
debtor or trustee in a U.S. bankruptcy. Or, Law Firm #1 is the attorney
for a Creditors’ Committee in a U.S. bankruptcy. Or, a member of Law
Firm #1 is the trustee of a liquidating trust created because of a U.S.
168
bankruptcy. Or, Law Firm #1 is the attorney for a debtor or trustee in a
pending U.S. bankruptcy proceeding where there is a proposed Debtorin-Possession financing.
In each of these cases, there should be no conflict of interest when a
law firm uses conflicts counsel in the situations discussed here. Law Firm
#1 may ethically represent Party #1 (its client), provided that conflicts
counsel, Law Firm #2, represents Party #1 in any situation where Party #1
has an interest adverse to Party #2, who is also a current client of Law
Firm #1 on unrelated matters. Law Firm #1, of course, will not assist Law
Firm #2 in these matters.
By using conflicts counsel, Law Firm #1 will never be in a position
where it is adverse to a current client. Law Firm #1 will not be
representing a bankruptcy client against a current client of Law Firm #1,
in violation of ABA Model Rule 1.7. Instead, Law Firm #1 will be
representing the bankruptcy client against various nonclients, while
conflicts counsel will be representing the bankruptcy client against any
current client of Law Firm #1 in unrelated matters. Thus, the per se rule
169
against simultaneous representation articulated in Cinema 5 and other
170
decisions does not require the court to disqualify Law Firm #1.

III. Précis and Recommendations
The use of conflicts counsel routinely arises in cases involving crossexamination, discovery, and bankruptcy, but it need not be limited to
these areas. There are other matters where the use of conflicts counsel
will protect the legitimate interests of the various clients without
imposing unnecessary expenses on the parties. For example, an issue on
appeal may come up for the first time, and it will raise a conflict for the
lawyer. Rather than disqualifying the law firm from all work on the
matter, the court may approve of conflicts counsel if the particular issue
171
is severable.
168. In such a case, the debtor or trustee, on the advice of Law Firm #1, will retain a different law
firm to represent its interests on the discrete matter. The debtor or trustee will not retain Law Firm #1
in any case in which it would be adverse to any current client of Law Firm #1. It is not wrong for a
lawyer to recommend that an individual or entity retain another lawyer to vindicate its interests. In
fact, that is what the ethics rules provide. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3 (2010) (“The
lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person [the debtor or trustee], other than the
advice to secure counsel.”).
169. 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976).
170. See Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., Nos. 99 Civ. 8780(JSM), 99 Civ. 4004(JSM),
2000 WL 145747 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000) (using similar language).
171. See, e.g., Buysse v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 448 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. 1989). The lawyer

Rotunda_62-HLJ-677 (Do Not Delete)

February 2011]

RESOLVING CLIENT CONFLICTS

3/4/2011 12:28 PM

705

Prospective litigation is another area where conflicts counsel will be
useful. Let us say that a Client has a distribution contract with a
Manufacturer. It is certainly foreseeable that disputes may arise under
this contract. Let us assume that Law Firm represents Client in
connection with this distribution contract, while simultaneously
representing Manufacturer in a local real-estate matter, completely
unrelated to Client’s business. Client and Law Firm should be able to
agree between themselves that Law Firm will not represent Client if
there is any dispute with Manufacturer. Client would use a separate
conflicts counsel if that contingency occurs.
This agreement eliminates the potential conflict without imposing
the opportunity cost of Law Firm refusing to represent Client merely
because of the possibility of the conflict. This agreement would not
require Manufacture’s consent. In the event of a lawsuit, conflicts
counsel would represent Client while Manufacturer would retain its own
counsel. But Law Firm could continue to represent Client and
172
Manufacturer on the unrelated issues.
The use of conflicts counsel need not be limited to litigation. It may
also be appropriate in negotiations in multiparty business. Law firms, of
course, cannot use this procedure as a sham, where the otherwiseconflicted firm becomes a behind-the-scenes manager of the matter that
it has undertaken not to pursue. And the law firm itself may not take
actions that hurt its other clients. But with those caveats, the presence of
one or two areas of conflict that can be severed would mean that the law
173
would not disqualify the lawyer altogether. In all such cases, a law firm

permissibly withdrew from preparing a portion of an appellate brief, thus avoiding a conflict. Id. The
court ruled that it would not require the lawyer for the judgment creditors to withdraw. Id. However,
the court said, conflicts counsel should have filed a separate brief, rather than merely take
responsibility for a portion of one brief. Id. This would have served to highlight the severability of the
issue. The court explained that the work of the conflicts counsel on appeal “was limited to
representation of the judgment creditors in the determination of the coverage question.” Id. On
appeal, the original counsel and the conflicts counsel “filed a joint brief in which there is no discernible
line of demarcation between insurance coverage issues and other issues involved in this litigation.” Id.
The court assumed that “the lawyers in question confined their activities on appeal to their respective
spheres of representation,” but went on to say that “separate briefs would have been a more fitting way
to carry out the undertaking to separate representation on the coverage issues from representation on
all other issues.” Id. (emphasis added).
172. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers supports the use of “conflicts
counsel,” but it does not use this term. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121
cmt. c(iii), illus. 4 (2000). Instead, it speaks of the law firm limiting the scope of its engagement: “Such
an agreement would not require the consent of Manufacturer.” Id.
173. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 20013 (2001) (addressing this issue, approving of using conflicts counsel, and citing Sumitomo with
approval). The opinion said that it was appropriate for another firm to bring the case against the client
that the principal firm cannot bring. Id.; see also Lawyers May Limit Scope of Representation to Dodge
Looming Conflict Between Clients, [Dec.-Jan. 2001] 17 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 455
(Aug. 1, 2001) (discussing the opinion).
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would be limiting the scope of its representation to avoid conflict with a
current or former client, Party #2, if the client whose representation the
law firm limits, Party #1, will consent after full disclosure and if that
limitation does not so restrict representation as to render it incompetent.
Careful lawyers should also consider asking their clients to waive, in
advance, any objection to using conflicts counsel to handle issues that are
discrete and severable, and do not involve risk of misusing the client’s
confidences. Clients, in other words, may waive in futuro breaches of
loyalty if the lawyer uses conflicts counsel to handle a discrete matter.
But, we would not reasonably expect clients to waive in futuro breaches
of confidentiality, because one cannot know now the significance in the
future of the breach of confidentiality.
A law firm that represents a client in a matter should not be forced
to disqualify itself simply because it represents another client in a
completely unrelated matter if the first client can hire a different law firm
to represent her in a discrete, severable part of that matter. In other
words, if Law Firm #1 represents Client #1 in a case adverse to Client #2,
Law Firm #1 should be disqualified if it simultaneously represents Client
#2 in other matters. However, if that case is severable into discrete parts,
Client #1 can avoid the need to disqualify its lawyer (Law Firm #1) by
hiring a different law firm to represent it in those parts of the case that
are adverse to Client #2.
In addition, lawyers and clients should be permitted to agree in
advance that conflicts counsel will be used, and that this agreement
should be enforceable. They should also be able to make a commitment
in advance as to what types of matters or parts of matters are discrete
and severable, such that use of conflicts counsel makes sense.
Alternatively, clients who do not like using the conflicts counsel
approach should be permitted to agree in advance with their lawyers not
to use this approach. Then, the lawyers will know the real opportunity
cost of representing a client who objects to using conflicts counsel.

Conclusion
Conflicts counsel is a useful tool to ameliorate the costs of
disqualifying a law firm, while protecting legitimate client interests in
confidentiality and loyalty. A few cases—typically unreported and
conclusory—embrace this technique but do not discuss its rationale. This
Article explains the justification. Additionally, courts should acknowledge
the direction of recent case law and adopt a rule that formalizes and
regularizes a procedure for using conflicts counsel. In those cases where
the matter causing the conflict is severable and distinct and the risks of
loss of confidentiality are minuscule, the courts should allow conflicts
counsel.

